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 ABSTRACT  The current models of pharmaceutical drug discovery display signifi cant 
ineffi ciencies. One ineffi ciency is the widespread prevalence of me-too drugs. Second, some 
patents can act as barriers to knowledge, by slowing down the pace of new discoveries. Third, 
there are higher costs for the public, who end up paying double costs  – subsidizing or funding 
research and development (R & D) that leads to new discoveries on the one hand, and, on the 
other, paying the social costs of restricted access to knowledge when the discoveries are privatized. 
Fourth, when the market returns are the sole guide to R & D of new drugs, diseases that are 
prevalent in markets with weaker buying power are neglected. Thus, policymakers need to 
identify a new, more cost-effective and innovative productive system for R & D. Policymakers are 
faced with very complex choices in designing their regulations. They want to promote access to 
medicines, to lower costs and to encourage research. Politically, they have to balance pressure 
from the industry with increasingly forceful demands from health advocacy groups. The article 
looks at four different sorts of policies that may be used to address some of the inadequacies in 
the current system, especially with regard to the management of R & D: promoting prizes over 
patents; directing innovation toward socially benefi cial outputs by adopting some form of value-
based pricing; publicly funding clinical trials to reduce confl icts of interest while reducing costs; 
and actively managing frontier technologies to maximize positive social spillovers. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 The public sector plays a disproportionately 
large part in biomedical research and health 
interventions, in particular paying a large 
fraction of total pharmaceutical expenditures. 
As Boldrin and Levine 1 note with respect to 
the case of the United States:  ‘  … private 
industry pays for only about one-third of 
biomedical research and development (R & D). 
By way of contrast, outside of the biomedical 
area, private industry pays for more than 
two-thirds of R & D ’ . 
 These numbers may, however, understate 
the role of government. Even in the United 
States, where the proportion of government 
expenditure in pharmaceuticals and health 
care is lower than in most other developed 
countries, 2 public spending (through Medicare 
and Medicaid) accounts for a large fraction 
of all prescription drugs. (Indeed, in several 
industrialized countries, the public sector is 
the major or even effective sole procurer 
of pharmaceutical products.) As such, 
government is indirectly paying for a large 
fraction of the costs of private research and 
development (R & D). Just as importantly, 
public entities such as the National Institutes 
of Health conduct a large proportion of 
clinical trials. 3 
 Given the signifi cance of the role of the 
public sector in health-care research 
expenditures, the challenge for policymakers 
is to design a system in which production is 
organized to maximize the societal benefi t 
from such public investment. 
 The production of knowledge is not like 
the production of ordinary goods and 
services, because knowledge is a public good. 
This means there is no easy answer to the 
question of what the best way of channeling 
resources effi ciently is. At the current 
juncture, however, public policy in 
biomedical research is characterized by 
contradictory impulses. 
 On the one hand, efforts to increase 
the pace of innovation have meant an 
ever-increasing extension of intellectual 
property rights in the past 30 years, so as to 
protect and encourage private investment in 
the sector. Fewer drug price controls, the 
extension of monopoly patent rights globally, 
limiting generic market competition and 
maintaining exclusive marketing arrangements 
all have the effect of increasing the price of 
pharmaceuticals, while potentially stimulating 
innovation. 
 At the same time, the efforts to cut 
spiraling medical costs and to extend health 
benefi ts to the population have necessitated 
signifi cantly increased government 
intervention into the sector. Thus, lowering 
drug prices through publicly funded buyers 
and insurers, allowing compulsory licensing, 
and other such policies help limit price  – 
at the potential cost of limiting innovation 
as well. 
 The tension between dynamic and static 
effi ciency is well known: policymakers have 
to balance effi ciency in the use of biomedical 
knowledge (refl ected, for example, in 
increased access to medicines) with effi ciency 
in the production of knowledge (refl ected, 
for instance, in the selection of worthwhile 
research projects and the development of new 
and better therapies, as well as access to 
knowledge that is useful in the production 
of knowledge). The critique of the current 
system is not so much that current 
arrangements have not correctly balanced the 
dynamic and static benefi ts; rather, it is that 
the existing framework of R & D displays 
signifi cant ineffi ciencies in both the use and 
production of knowledge, particularly with 
respect to the ways in which the patent 
system works. Moreover, changes in recent 
years (some noted above) may have 
exacerbated these problems. 
 One can point to several ineffi ciencies 
in the production of knowledge. The 
widespread prevalence of me-too drugs  – 
drugs that are not signifi cant improvements 
on existing drugs but which obtain patent 
protection  – is a signifi cant drag on 
innovation. Societal benefi ts per dollar of 
research are reduced. Not only are the 
benefi ts of the me-too drug of limited value, 
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but also the knowledge that there will be a 
future me-too drug for any big innovation 
may deter real innovation. Me-too drugs 
are designed to grab rents from genuine 
innovators, and with superior marketing 
can even absorb the bulk of the market  – 
even if the drug is inferior in therapeutic 
value. 
 Even when rents are not dissipated in this 
manner, patents act as a winner-takes-all 
competition, and hence the return in terms 
of the market is not a refl ection of the 
marginal social contribution of the patent 
owner, which is related to having the drug 
on the market earlier than otherwise would 
have been the case. Indeed, much of the 
human genome research had little social 
value. There was a publicly fi nanced global 
effort to decode the human genome. The 
race to beat that project to get a patent did 
have a social cost: by making the knowledge 
less accessible, social benefi ts from the human 
genome project were reduced. 
 A third ineffi ciency occurs when publicly 
funded or subsidized research is privatized by 
selling medical advances to private entities 
that then obtain patents on the advances. 
In these cases, the patent clearly has not 
advanced the state of knowledge. Society 
faces the social costs associated with restricting 
access to knowledge, without any putative 
dynamic benefi ts. (One can think of the sale 
as providing funds to the government; one 
has to assess as to whether this is the most 
effi cient way of raising revenues. The costs, 
both in terms of access to drugs and future 
research, can be signifi cant.) 
 Finally, as private incentives respond to the 
size of potential markets, several diseases that 
affect the poor, and thus have potentially 
limited markets, are not the focus of suffi cient 
R & D investment. Here, the point is that 
 ‘ private profi tability ’ is not a good measure 
of social return  – unless we believe that 
the social value of health increases 
commensurately with the ability to pay. 
 While the costs of the patent system in 
restricting access to knowledge are well 
known, it is perhaps not so widely recognized 
that the system may impede innovation. Most 
research builds on prior research, and thus 
requires access to this prior knowledge. 
Patents are a form of a prize system in which 
returns are captured by the exercise of 
monopoly power. This means exclusion of 
benefi ts of usage, but can also impede the 
research process by limiting follow-on 
innovations that depend on knowledge 
previously generated, but privately owned. 
 A complicating factor in assessing the 
benefi ts of  ‘ static ineffi ciencies ’ (justifi ed 
as a means of providing the fi nance that is 
required to ensure dynamic effi ciency) is that 
only a fraction of the revenues raised by, 
say, monopoly pricing gets translated into 
increased research. One can think of 
monopoly pricing as a tax, supposedly 
directed at funding R & D. But a relatively 
small fraction of the money raised goes to 
the intended purpose. It is as if we have an 
ineffi cient tax collection system. 
 Indeed, there are complex linkages 
between the R & D system and market 
distortions. The structure of marketing 
(detailers) is designed to reduce the elasticity 
of demand (a doctor who has participated in 
trials is more likely to prescribe the drug; a 
patient who gets a free sample is likely to 
stick with it so long as it has no adverse 
side effects and so long as it is reasonably 
effi cacious). It is not a system designed to 
maximize information available to the 
practitioner, and therefore to maximize the 
quality of health care. 
 Both dynamic and static ineffi ciencies have 
been tolerated as long as the pharmaceutical 
industry has been in good health and drugs 
have been regularly developed and marketed. 
However, for the last few years, there has 
been an increasing concern in the research-
based pharmaceutical sector as to the 
consequences of what has been termed  ‘ the 
patent cliff  ’ . Between now and 2014, several 
blockbuster drugs that served to maintain the 
high levels of profi tability of large 
pharmaceutical companies will go off patent, 
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leading to increased generic competition and 
the erosion of the most secure stream of cash 
fl ows. Products such as Lipitor (Atorvastatin) 
and Nexium (Esomeprazole)  – among the 
world ’ s best-selling drugs  – will be challenged 
by generic competition in the largest and 
most lucrative markets. At the same time, 
there is little concrete evidence that a new 
pipeline of drugs will be effectively developed 
and marketed, despite medical advances 
such as mapping the human genome. 4 
Simultaneously, given the concerns over 
rising health costs and the prospect of 
health-care reform in the United States, 
there is increasing pressure on profi ts through 
buyers and insurers. 5 – 7 
 These coeval factors together constitute 
a set of challenges for the pharmaceutical 
industry, which require a reorganization of 
their strategies for innovation and an overhaul 
of their long-term relationship with generics. 8 
Already, the last few years have seen 
signifi cant developments within the industry 
as a response. 
 First, there has been an important set 
of mergers, acquisitions and agreements 
(Eli Lilly-ImClone, Daiichi Sankyo-Ranbaxy, 
Novartis-Speedel, Teva-Barr, GlaxoSmithKline-
Aspen and so on), which have been seen as 
ways to enter new markets with a generic 
arm and as a consolidation within the 
generic sector. 
 Second, there has been renewed interest 
in the creation of  ‘ authorized generics ’ that 
maintain market share. Finally, there have 
been deals in which generics have been 
compensated to delay entry into lucrative 
markets (most egregiously in the case of 
Ranbaxy and Pfi zer over Lipitor /
 Atorvastatin). 9 – 11 
 From a social viewpoint, this period of fl ux 
also affords an opportunity for governments 
and policymakers to ask more fundamental 
questions about the process of innovation in 
pharmaceuticals. Specifi cally, is the current 
system the best way to go about discovering 
and testing novel therapies to ameliorate 
health throughout the world? If not, are there 
alternative models for the R & D of new 
pharmaceutical products that are viable and 
that should be promoted, to maximize the 
social benefi t of the efforts of pharmaceutical 
companies? 
 In what follows, we argue that current 
systems of regulation, incentives and 
constraints lead to socially undesirable and 
wasteful efforts. We propose some alternatives 
for consideration, which could, we believe, 
be effectively implemented by policymakers 
in different countries. Some of these proposals 
have been considered by us in earlier work 
and we revisit them here. In what follows, 
we consider some of the more glaring 
inadequacies of the current system for 
considerations of innovation and the potential 
remedies for them. Such an exercise will 
certainly not exhaust the irrationalities 
present. It can only highlight those that we 
consider to be of greatest importance. 
 SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE 
CURRENT SYSTEM 
 Neglected diseases and the prize 
system 
 The  ‘ 90 -10 rule ’ of pharmaceutical research 
(the idea that 90 per cent of pharmaceutical 
research goes toward tackling diseases that 
affect 10 per cent of the global population) 
persists. This is not at all surprising from an 
economic viewpoint. The size of the private 
market in terms of potential revenue (not 
individuals benefi ted) is simply too small for a 
disease like Schistosomiasis or Trypanosomiasis 
for major research-based pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in R & D. This is because 
these are diseases of the poor and those who 
are faced with this disease lack the ability to 
pay for even a part of the fi xed costs of 
production. Although governments of these 
countries can (and do) spend resources to 
develop medicines or to provide preventative 
treatments, these efforts are necessarily 
limited. Furthermore, the expertise in 
developing effective and new chemical 
entities is something that is very often 
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confi ned to private sector fi rms in the 
developed world. 
 Scholars and commentators have noted that 
there are mechanisms whereby this seemingly 
insurmountable set of obstacles can be 
overcome. Most importantly, the prize fund 
mechanism is a way in which to provide a 
certain guaranteed return to an innovator to 
cover the (considerable) costs of production. 12 
Under such a system, a guaranteed prize (let 
us say US $ 1 billion) will be provided to the 
fi rst producer of a viable therapy for a 
neglected disease. Once produced and paid 
for by the prize, the drug can be provided 
at cost. Drugs that provide little additional 
therapeutic value will be provided 
compensation from the fund, but at a 
substantially reduced amount. 
 Such a program can be funded either by 
industrialized countries or philanthropic 
organizations. Indeed, there is no reason why 
there cannot be a collective fund organized 
by the countries that are most severely 
affected by the diseases, so as to scale up 
their own abilities. Further, within some 
developing countries (such as India and 
Brazil), there are vibrant pharmaceutical fi rms 
that could be ready partners for the testing 
and marketing of new drugs. 
 Prizes form an alternative to the patenting 
system but are similar in that they provide a 
reward for innovation that guarantees the 
fi xed costs of innovation and a markup once 
the drug has been produced. There are by 
now several versions of a prize fund that have 
met with reasonable amounts of interest from 
the academic community and the medical /
 public policy communities at large. The 
details vary, but the fundamental design 
(to motivate research by guaranteeing the 
size and viability of the market for a drug 
targeting neglected diseases) remains. Among 
the most well known are the Advanced 
Market Commitment for vaccines, which has 
already been launched, the Health Impact 
Fund, 13 and the CPTech proposals. 14,15 
 Although all have their advantages and 
disadvantages, it would appear paramount that 
the particular design of a prize fund should 
not mimic the negative impacts of the patent 
system. Thus, proposals for the prize fund 
should ideally not limit generic competition 
once the drug has been identifi ed. If a 
prize fund limits competition post-reward 
(through exclusive marketing arrangements, 
for example), the full social benefi ts of 
competition (lowering prices as much as 
possible through process innovations and so 
on) will not be realized, even if prices are 
lower than they may be otherwise. Moreover, 
market competition provides the only 
effective mechanism to enforce market 
discipline and ensure that drugs are provided 
as close to cost as possible, following the 
discovery of the new chemical entity. 
 Other programs such as those of the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, the 
Medicines for Malaria Venture, the Global 
Alliance for TB Drug Development or the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative rely 
on similar strategies whereby the initial cost 
of the drug is not paid for by higher fi nal 
drug prices or by long patent monopolies. 
Such public – private partnerships have met 
with some success. Unlike the prize fund 
though, they require the funding agency to 
provide the outlay for R & D before bringing 
the new chemical to fruition, which may not 
always be possible. Providing prior funding 
requires, in addition, the funder of the prize 
to make a selection among candidates. One 
of the advantages of the patent and prize 
systems is that there is  self-selection. Those 
who believe that they are most likely to 
succeed compete. 
 Rewarding genuine innovation 
through value-based pricing 
 The current patent system treats all new 
chemical entities as innovative, and equally 
so. This is a source of substantial ineffi ciency. 
From a social viewpoint, the degree of 
innovation of a new chemical entity should 
not be decided by whether it is  ‘ non-obvious ’ 
(a necessary standard for patent protection) 
but by considering whether it affords 
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signifi cant additional clinical benefi ts. The 
fact that the current system provides rewards 
to non-obviousness and not additional 
therapeutic value is refl ected in many 
therapeutic categories, but most evidently in 
the market for statins. It is well recognized 
that there is broad substitutability between 
competing brands (except at high doses) 
between statins. However, the fact that there 
is a large market for these drugs and that 
patenting drugs in this category is relatively 
easy has meant that pharmaceutical companies 
have spent an enormous amount of resources 
in undertaking clinical trials and marketing 
for drugs that are very similar to existing 
products. Although these so called  ‘ me-too ’ 
drugs may have some increased therapeutic 
value and increased consumer welfare through 
product competition (see in this regard 
Lichtenberg and Philipson 16 ), it would be 
diffi cult to claim that the marginal social 
benefi t from each additional drug is close 
to matching the marginal social and private 
cost. Moreover, given the perverse incentive 
structure, a considerable amount of research 
is directed toward such ventures. One 
estimate suggests that expenditure on such 
costs constitute 80 per cent of R & D 
expenditure. 17 Finally, as drugs are so similar 
and have been very costly to produce  – a 
common, if disputed, estimate is  $ 800 million 
per new chemical entity 18  – profi t-making 
fi rms must spend enormous resources on 
brand differentiation and advertising to 
maximize their market share  – once again, 
an expenditure with little or no clear social 
value. 19 
 As we have pointed out in our earlier 
paper, 20 there may be ways in which to limit 
this ineffi ciency by providing better incentives 
to pharmaceutical companies, which 
simultaneously lower costs. Among the more 
interesting ideas in this regard is the idea of 
value-based pricing. In systems where the 
purchase price of drugs is negotiated by 
centralized government entities or large 
intermediaries, linking the price that 
regulators are willing to pay for a metric 
of additional value to health will limit the 
current system ’ s perverse incentives to 
overproduce me-too drugs. Certainly, for the 
implementation of such a program, the devil 
is in the details. The metric by which to 
measure the added value of the drug is not 
something that is obvious, and choosing the 
appropriate measure is a matter of social, 
medical and ethical debate. However, in 
systems where there is such a negotiation 
over drug prices, there is substantial interest 
in such a proposal. For example, the British 
Offi ce of Fair Trading recently proposed that 
the United Kingdom replace profi t and price 
controls with a value-based approach to 
pricing, which would work to relate the 
expenditure of drugs to their incremental 
clinical and therapeutic value to patients and 
the broader National Health Service. As 
Claxton  et al 21 point out, there is a direct 
way to implement this by measuring the 
effect of new drugs ’ quality-adjusted life 
years. Apart from doing away with the 
arbitrary system of profi t controls currently 
in place, such a program will reduce the 
incentive to produce and market me-too 
drugs, while simultaneously making more 
fundamental breakthroughs more profi table 
and certain. At the moment, the production 
of truly socially benefi cial drugs can be 
discouraged by the potential threat of an 
inferior rival me-too drug that is better 
marketed. 22 
 Reducing R & D costs and confl icts of 
interest in drug discovery: Promoting 
public funding of clinical trials 
 In Jayadev and Stiglitz, 20 we pointed to 
another severe problem in the production of 
new drugs, and a potential remedy. As many 
scholars have noted, cost increases in clinical 
trials, especially during stage (III) trials, have 
made the overall production cost of a new 
chemical entity prohibitively expensive. 
Indeed, some estimates suggest that clinical 
trials account for around half of the fi nal cost 
of drug production. Given this fact, 
enhancing effi ciency and reducing costs in 
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clinical trials may be key to renewing the 
vibrancy of research in pharmaceuticals. 
 One proposal to achieve these ends that 
appears very appealing is the idea to publicly 
fund clinical trials in pharmaceuticals. Detailed 
proposals have been made by Lewis  et al 23 
and Baker. 17 The proposals differ in their 
details, but both involve federal oversight 
of the clinical trial process and putting an 
arms-length distance between production on 
the one hand and the process of testing of 
claims on the other. The fundamental 
purpose is to do away with the intrinsic 
confl ict of interest whereby drug companies 
that produce the drugs also pay for their 
evaluation (which is essentially the purpose 
of the clinical trial). This has led to many 
(predictable) negative outcomes, such as 
attempts to conceal information about side 
effects and overstating clinical benefi ts. The 
Vioxx issue is a case in point. 
 But, while establishing oversight and 
distance is the proposals ’ major advantage, 
there are several incidental benefi ts, the most 
important of which is that it would make 
the market for drugs more effi cient and 
competitive. 
 There are several arguments in favor of 
promoting public funding of clinical trials. 
First, maintaining an objective distance 
between producer and a clinical trial agency 
would limit the incentive to push me-too 
drugs through the trial phase in the fi rst 
place. Such an agency could quickly point to 
the degree of improvement (if any) provided 
by the drug and could weed out drugs that 
had little therapeutic value. Second, such a 
program could actually enhance the research 
process by making the information conducted 
in clinical trials publicly available. The public-
good nature of information thus provided 
would benefi t other researchers, and possibly 
improve the information available for those 
using the drug. Third, there is a distortion in 
the current system in which the testers of the 
drugs  – doctors participating in trials  – are 
incentivized to promote the drug. Often, 
doctors are paid to recruit patients into the 
clinical trial, and can be recompensed 
thousands of dollars per patient. These 
relationships can be quite extensive: one 
report suggested that as many as 37 per cent 
of internists surveyed in the state of Maryland 
 ‘ engag[ed] in pharmaceutical-sponsored 
clinical trials and / or lectures to supplement 
their incomes ’ (cited in Hafemeister and 
Bryan 24 ). Clearly, doctors who participate in 
trials are more likely to prescribe the drug 
and thereby reduce competition. Even when 
there is not an explicit monetary reward, high 
switching costs effectively lock in a part of 
the market and reduced competition. Unlike 
with private industry-conducted clinical trials, 
in a publicly funded clinical trial system, there 
is little or no incentive for those undertaking 
the trials to overcompensate or otherwise 
bribe doctors to prescribe the drug. Nor is 
there any incentive to lock in a particular 
drug. Fourth, the current system is stacked 
against smaller (and typically more innovative) 
biotech and pharmaceutical fi rms that do 
not possess the large cash reserves that larger 
pharmaceutical companies do, and thus are 
often forced into partnerships to bring a 
drug through the trial process and to market. 
As such, this will enhance research 
competitiveness and effi ciency. Finally, a 
more transparent and open system will greatly 
enhance confi dence and trust in the drug 
discovery process. 
 How might such a public system be 
funded? One could consider both national 
and international efforts to promote such a 
system. While at the moment the expertise in 
running clinical trials is limited, especially at 
phase (III), there is a great deal of interest in 
expanding capacity, especially in developing 
countries. Thus, clinical trial outsourcing 
agencies are increasing in number and more 
operations are moving to places such as 
India, where costs are signifi cantly lower. 
Independent contractors for clinical trials 
are sure to take advantage of such cost 
differentials. Even if the system were to be 
entirely nationally based, one can envision 
paying for clinical trials by imposing a charge 
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on the sale of fi nal drugs, or a general tax or 
by dedicating a stream of expenditures as part 
of health reform. The costs of the drug 
testing will be paid one way or the other. 
A well-designed tax would be both more 
equitable and more effi cient. 25 
 Limiting costly duplications and 
promoting research commons for 
frontier technologies 
 All competition in innovation will involve 
some duplication of R & D efforts. As several 
papers have shown theoretically, the overall 
impact of patent competition in particular has 
ambiguous effects on the overall intensity of 
R & D efforts. 26,27 While this is cause for 
concern in general, it is more urgently so 
with respect to pharmaceuticals where the 
initial R & D cost is high enough to force 
companies that lose the patent race to fi nd 
ways to differentiate the product just enough 
to obtain its own patent and its own part of 
the market. There is little relation then 
between private and social returns, as we 
have emphasized in the case of me-too drugs. 
In a perhaps even more troubling vein, the 
race to patent the human genome has 
followed a similar pattern. Although it is true 
that the race made the knowledge available 
earlier, some of that knowledge was 
immediately enclosed by patents that limited 
both further innovation and use. A case in 
point is that of Myriad Genetics, the holder 
of the  BRCA patents used for detection of 
breast cancer. The exorbitant cost for genetic 
tests has meant that many women who might 
otherwise have been tested must forego that 
option and be unable to take remedial action 
and therapy until it is too late. 28 
 Although such an enclosure has had effects 
on limiting usage, it has also had perhaps 
more serious negative impacts on discouraging 
further innovation by insisting on expensive 
licenses or not allowing any usage of the 
scientifi c information at all. In a novel paper, 
Williams 29 compares the subsequent scientifi c 
research and product development outcomes 
on genes sequenced by the private fi rm 
Celera and the public Human Genome 
Project. Her analysis suggests that Celera ’ s 
intellectual property, which enclosed 
knowledge, led to a 30 per cent reduction 
in subsequent scientifi c and product 
development outcomes. 
 The mapping of the human genome is 
sometimes termed a frontier technology, as 
the potential for enormous gains in health 
outcomes and further knowledge arises from 
it. Other examples include the technology for 
polymerase chain reactions or gene transfer 
technology. Ensuring access to such 
knowledge is critical to ensuring that the 
maximum social benefi t, both in the short 
and the long run, fl ows from it. Perhaps the 
best way to ensure this is to change the 
regulatory system so that frontier technologies 
are as much in the public domain as possible 
at the outset. Unlike most goods, scientifi c 
knowledge does not suffer from a commons 
problem, simply because knowledge is non-
rivalrous. 30 But it can suffer from a severe 
anti-commons problem (as is evident from 
Williams ’ analysis). It is ineffi cient to restrict 
access to knowledge. Given this, policies 
should aim to maximize the utilization of 
such breakthroughs. 
 Several proposals have been made in this 
regard, which deserve further consideration. 
Kremer ’ s 31 proposal for a patent buyout and 
the subsequent placing of the knowledge in 
the public domain is one such proposal. 
A system in which several countries put aside 
the funds for such buyouts as part of an 
R & D treaty can be envisioned. Such a patent 
buyout pool could complement or be part of 
a prize fund encouraging patent commons, 
wherein companies voluntarily place their 
intellectual property in the public domain. 
Such an initiative should be distinguished 
from a patent pool wherein only those 
contributing their patents to the commons 
are allowed to use the others ’ intellectual 
property. The latter  – while potentially 
benefi cial to avoid patent thickets and 
anti-commons problems  – can also limit 
competition and innovation by excluding 
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those who have little intellectual property 
to contribute in the fi rst place. However, 
considering the fact that genuine patent 
commons are likely to be undersupplied, 
other policies might need to be adopted. 
For example, public research could be given 
blanket exemption from having to pay 
licensing fees for frontier technologies. 
Similarly, if there is an urgent and compelling 
health need, a compulsory licensing 
framework can be adapted within 
industrialized countries to allow for the use 
of such technologies. Another option is to 
encourage a compensatory liability scheme, 
whereby users of the technology are not 
prevented from the use of the information, 
but must pay a fi xed fee for its use. In 
addition to these, Reichman and Giordano 
Coltart 32 provide a much more detailed and 
nuanced set of policies that are legally 
permissible to manage frontier technologies 
and to allow for knowledge spillovers. 
 CONCLUSION 
 In this article, we have examined some of 
the major problems with the current models 
of pharmaceutical drug discovery. All across 
the world, pharmaceutical costs continue to 
rise; R & D-based pharmaceutical companies 
in the large industrialized markets are 
increasingly concerned about the implications 
of greater government regulation and other 
measures, partially intended to lower prices. 
There is genuine concern about the slowing 
down of the pace of production of new and 
innovative drugs. Generic companies  – 
especially those in the developing world  – are 
faced with the prospect of extinction and / or 
severe restructuring (partly as a result of 
increased patent stringency related to Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) ). Policymakers are faced 
with very complex choices in designing their 
medical and industrial regulations. 33 They 
want to promote access to medicines, to 
lower costs and to encourage research. 
Politically, they have to balance pressure 
from the industry with increasingly forceful 
demands from health advocacy groups. 
 Therefore, it is an opportune and critical 
time to consider what can be done about the 
glaring irrationalities in the current system, 
especially with regard to the management of 
R & D. We have considered four different 
sorts of policies that may be used to address 
some of these inadequacies: promoting prizes 
over patents, directing innovation towards 
socially benefi cial outputs by adopting some 
form of value-based pricing, publicly funding 
clinical trials to reduce confl icts of interest 
while reducing costs, and actively managing 
frontier technologies to maximize positive 
social spillovers. Some of these ideas are 
already under active consideration in various 
forms by governments and stakeholders across 
the world. As the industry struggles toward a 
new model, we hope that these proposals 
come to be seen as attractive ways to direct 
innovation in which the social benefi ts are 
highest. Further, we hope they can promote 
innovation in ways that make the benefi ts of 
the knowledge produced widely available  – 
both to promote future innovation and to 
ensure improved health outcomes now and 
in the future. 
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